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NOTES AND COMMENTS
INTERSTATE DIVORCE LAW

T HE Supreme Court has again spoken on the complicated law
of divorce obtained in foreign jurisdictions, this time in the
case of Johnson v. Muelberger.' The divorce problem considered
in that case has to do with the effect and validity of divorces obtained in one state when enforcement is sought in another state.
Prior to a careful consideration of Johnson v. Muelberger it would
be well to review the conflict of laws principles governing the outof-state divorce problem.
Legally speaking, a marriage is a contract between the husband
and wife, but the state is also an interested party to the contract.
Thus the parties cannot of their own accord abandon the relationship of man and wife, but can only do so with the sanction of the
state. A divorce can be stated simply as "the termination of the
legal relationship between husband and wife by an act of law." 2
The nature of the divorce action itself is not without its complications. It is certainly not an in personam action, for if it were, a
judgment could be rendered in any state which had jurisdiction of
the parties, and, moreover, a valid decree could not be rendered
with constructive service only of the defendant. It is much closer
in nature to an in rein or a quasi in rem action with the marital
relation before the court as the res. This does not seem to be such
an absurd fiction when it is considered that our modern social
structure is built around the. family relationship.
The basis for granting recognition to the judgments of sister
states is found in the Full Faith and Credit Clause' of the Constitution of the United States. However, this clause does not require
that judgments of a court not possessing jurisdiction in the conflict
of laws sense to be recognized by sister states. Hence a judgment
which is not based on jurisdiction, obtained in X state, will not
1340

U. S. 581 (1951).

2 COODRICIlT, CONFLICT OF LAWS

'U. S.

CONST.

Art. IV, § 1.

(3d ed. 1949) 395.
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be required, under the Constitution, to be enforced and recognized
in Y state.4 Therefore, at the outset, the important question of
migratory divorce law is, "What jurisdictional facts are necessary
to be pleaded and proved in order to give a court jurisdiction to
sever the marital relation?" There is no doubt, since the Supreme
Court handed down Williams v. North Carolina,5 that the most
basic jurisdictional fact is the domicil of the parties, and this
domicil is the domicil of the parties at the time the divorce action
is instituted. 6
Since the first Williams case,7 it seems firmly established that
the state of the domicil of either spouse has jurisdiction to render
a divorce decree which is valid and will be given full faith and
credit by the other states. This appears to be a logical result, if
domicil is necessary for jurisdiction in the first place, inasmuch as
the state of the person's domicil is intimately concerned with that
person, and hence should have the power to terminate his marital
relation. Prior to the decision in the Williams case the Supreme
Court had held in Haddock v. Haddock' that divorces required to
be recognized everywhere could only be rendered in the state of
the matrimonial domicil, which seemed to be the last domicil of
the husband and wife while they were still living together. How.
ever, the Haddock doctrine seems to violate the modern principle
of domiciliary law, which recognizes that a wife can acquire domicil separate and apart from her husband, and the Williams case
effectively overruled the Haddock decision.
It has already been observed that a state is only required to
recognize judgments rendered in the courts of a sister state when
based on valid jurisdiction. That a record can be contradicted as
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877).
5325 U. S. 226 (1945).
6 The principles of domiciliary law will not be discussed here. The RESTATEMENT O
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934), § 9, states that domicil is "the place with which a person
has a settled connection for certain legal purposes, either because his home is there,
or because that place is assigned to him by the law."
7 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942).
8 201 U. S. 562 (1905).
4
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to the facts necessary to give a court jurisdiction is another prin.
ciple which is firmly established by early decisions 9 , and which is
restated in the second Williams case. 10
In the famous Dorrancecases," where the power to levy a death
tax depended on the domicil of the deceased, Pennsylvania courts
found the deceased had been domiciled in Pennsylvania prior to
his death and levied the tax on the estate. In another action New
Jersey courts found that the deceased had been domiciled in New
Jersey prior to his death, and levied the tax in favor of New Jersey. The Supreme Court denied certiorari, 2 thus holding that the
courts of one state are not bound by the finding of domicil made
in the courts of a sister state.
The decision in the second Williams case logically follows with
an application of the principles just discussed. In this case the Su.
preme Court upheld a conviction of bigamous cohabitation of the
defendants, Mr. Williams and Mrs. Hendrix. The defendants had
lived in North Carolina; they went to Nevada and obtained uncontested divorces from their respective spouses; then they married
each other and returned to North Carolina. The Supreme Court
said that the North Carolina court could make a finding independent of that of the Nevada court on the issue of domicil, which the
North Carolina court did. Since the defendants were not found to
be domiciled in Nevada, the Nevada divorce decree did not have
to be given full faith and credit.
The principle that domicil can be relitigated to attack the
validity of a divorce on the grounds of no jurisdiction thus appears to be firmly established unless overruled by a legislative
body. The problem of the decisions subsequent to the Williams
cases has been, "Who can relitigate the issue of domicil?"
9 Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457 (1873).
10 "In short, the decree of divorce is a conclusive adjudication of everything except
the jurisdictional facts upon which it is founded, and domicil is a jurisdictional fact.
To permit the necessary finding of domicil by one State to foreclose all States in the
protection of their social institutions would be intolerable." 325 U. S. at 232.
11 In re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 Atl. 303 (1932) ; id., 115 N. J. Eq. 327,
170 At]. 601 (1934).
12 Dorrance v. Martin, 298 U. S. 678 (1936).
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A spouse who appears and answers in a divorce proceeding cannot attack the validity of the divorce on the issue of domicil, because the finding of the court granting the divorce is res judicata
as to him. 3 This is true whether or not the party actually contests
the issue of domicil in the divorce proceeding, for if the divorce
is contested, then be has had the opportunity to contest domicil.
The equitable principle of estoppel also applies to preclude a
later attack on the validity of a divorce. Thus, a party procuring
an invalid divorce will later be estopped from asserting any rights
as a spouse.' 4 A spouse who relies on an invalid divorce and remarries will not be permitted to annul the second marriage on
the grounds that the divorce decree was invalid.' 5
The latest pronouncement by the Supreme Court is in the prin.
cipal case, Johnson v. Muelberger. The facts of the Johnson case
were as follows: Mr. Johnson married his first wife, and a daughter, the defendant in the case, was born of this marriage. The first
wife died, and Mr. Johnson married Madoline Ham. She and Mr.
Johnson lived in New York until she obtained a divorce, which
was contested by Mr. Johnson, in Florida. The undisputed facts
of the present case showed that Madoline Ham did not comply
with the jurisdictional ninety-day residence statute of Florida.
Later Mr. Johnson contracted marriage again, this time to Genevieve Johnson, the plaintiff in the present case. He lived with her
until he died testate, leaving all of his estate to his daughter.
However, under New York law his third wife had a right to onethird of the estate, and she elected to take this statutory share. The
election was contested by the daughter, who contended that Mr.
Johnson and his third wife were not legally married because Mr.
Johnson was not validly divorced from his second wife. The case
was a collateral attack on the validity of a divorce by a stranger
to the divorce judgment. The Supreme Court held that the daughter
could not attack the divorce decree of Florida, saying:
18 Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343 (1948).

14 Curry v. Curry, 79 F. 2d 172 (D.C. App. 1935).
15 Goodloe v. Hawk, 113 F. 2d 753 (D.C. App. 1940).
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When a divorce cannot be attacked for lack of jurisdiction by parties
actually before the court or strangers in the rendering state, it cannot be
attacked by them anywhere in the Union. The Full Faith and Credit
clause forbids."'
It is interesting to note that in principle this was the holding
of the New York state court, but the court found that the daughter
could have attacked the divorce in Florida. The Supreme Court
held that the daughter could not have attacked the divorce in
Florida saying, "No Florida case has come to our attention holding that a child may contest in Florida its parent's divorce where
the parent was barred from contesting, as here, by res judicata.""
The Supreme Court further reasoned that if the laws of Florida
were such that the child was in privity with her father, then she
would be barred from attacking the validity of the divorce, for her
father was barred by estoppel under the doctrine of Sherrer v.
Sherrer. s Or if the Florida law is like the New York law in such
a case, then the daughter had a mere expectancy as an heir at the
time of the divorce, and this would not be enough to qualify her to
bring a suit.
It seems evident that the United States Supreme Court is not
inclined to invalidate a divorce if it is possible to uphold it. At
least this is the trend since the Williams cases were decided, for
since those decisions each subsequent case has restricted the right
of parties to challenge a divorce decree. In the opinion of this
writer a better rule could not be adopted by the Court than that
which Freeman declared in his work on Judgments and which the
Supreme Court quoted in the Johnson decision:
It is only those strangers who, if the judgment were given full faith and
credit and effect, would be prejudiced in regard to some pre-existing
right, that are permitted to impeach the judgment. Being neither parties
to the action, nor entitled to manage the cause nor appeal from the
judgment, they are by law allowed to impeach it whenever it is at18 340 U. S. at 589.
Id. at 587.
Is334 U. S. 343 (1948).
17
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tempted to be enforced against them so as to affect rights or interest
acquired prior to its rendition. 9
The Johnson case could have been decided using this rule, for the
daughter had no right or interest, beyond a mere expectancy,
which was affected by the divorce decree. The Court in principle
seems to have followed the rule, which seems to be a desirable one.
Such a rule would not prevent a state from enforcing its strong
public policy against migratory divorces, for it would have its
remedy in the form of bigamy prosecutions.
Perhaps the best solution is suggested by Stumberg, who indicates that a person who lives in a state which has stringent divorce
laws, should either actually move out of the state or remain married. He writes:
The real underlying point of controversy as to migratory divorce is
whether those who are unwilling to cut loose their home ties to secure
a divorce may get the one while still retaining
the other. In a sense they
20
want to eat their cake and have it, too.
George S. Finley.*

19 1FIEKMAN,

JUDCMENTS (5th ed. 1925) 636.

20 STUMBEIIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d

ed. 1951) 306.

*Member of the Texas State Bar; member, Student Editorial Board of the Southwestern Law Journal, 1951-1952.

